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The	  Colonial	  Debris	  of	  Bandung:	  Facilitating	  the	  Rise	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  in	  
India,	  Ratna	  Kapur	  	  “The	  despised,	  the	  insulted,	  the	  hurt,	  the	  dispossessed	  -­‐‑-­‐‑	  in	  short,	  the	  underdogs	  of	  the	  human	  race	  were	  meeting.	  Here	  were	  class	  and	  racial	  and	  religious	  consciousness	  on	  a	  global	  scale…..This	  meeting	  of	  the	  rejected	  was	  in	  itself	  a	  kind	  of	  judgment	  upon	  the	  Western	  world!"	  (Curtain	  1955,	  p.	  (Curtain	  R.,	  The	  colour	  of	  
curtain,	  Mississippi:	  University	  Press	  of	  Mississippi,	  1956)	  “[o]ne	  day	  everybody	  is	  themselves—and	  the	  next	  day	  they	  are	  Hindu,	  Muslim,	  Sikh,	  Christian.	  People	  shrink,	  dwindling	  into	  symbols”	  (Kidwai	  1991,	  p.	  93)	  Kidwai	  B.,	  
Cracking	  India	  (London:	  Milkweed	  Editions,	  1991)	  p.	  93 	  In	  April	  1955,	  a	  gathering	  of	  over	  600	  delegates	  and	  29	  nations	  at	  Bandung	  met	  to	  articulate	  a	  “third	  way”	  of	  operating	  within	  the	  existing	  global	  order	  that	  was	  increasingly	  being	  shaped	  by	  Cold	  War	  alliances.	  It	  was	  an	  effort	  that	  combined	  the	  nationalist	  urges	  of	  Asian	  and	  African	  countries,	  whose	  common	  goal	  was	  to	  struggle	  against	  colonialism,	  racism,	  discrimination,	  and	  for	  equality	  for	  all.	  	  And	  while	  these	  noble	  endeavours	  continue	  to	  inform	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  constitutions	  of	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  present	  at	  Bandung,	  sixty	  years	  on,	  scholars	  have	  increasingly	  questioned	  whether	  the	  values	  that	  infused	  Bandung	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose	  and	  progress	  have	  boomeranged.	  In	  this	  article	  I	  examine	  how	  the	  modernist	  project	  of	  challenging	  racism,	  discrimination,	  and	  securing	  equality,	  are	  all	  ideals	  that	  have	  been	  used	  by	  conservative	  and	  right	  wing	  forces	  in	  the	  postcolonial	  context	  to	  set	  up	  a	  relationship	  with	  its	  own	  citizenry	  on	  terms	  that	  are	  precisely	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter.	  	  And	  the	  seeds	  for	  this	  endeavor	  are	  found	  in	  the	  anti-­‐‑colonial,	  anti-­‐‑western	  framing	  of	  the	  Bandung	  conference,	  where	  newly	  formed	  nation-­‐‑states	  sought	  to	  set	  themselves	  up	  as	  part	  of	  a	  distinct	  cultural	  and	  national	  project.	  	  I	  pursue	  this	  discussion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  postcolonial	  India,	  and	  how	  the	  revolutionary	  cravings	  for	  liberal	  equality	  are	  ultimately	  restrained	  by	  a	  nationalist	  pursuit	  that	  is	  articulated	  within	  a	  cultural	  and	  political	  sensibility	  that	  seeks	  to	  distinguish	  itself	  from	  the	  west,	  and	  the	  former	  colonial	  power	  (Vajpeyi	  2012).	  	  It	  is	  this	  tension	  that	  has	  enabled	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  dedicated	  to	  establishing	  India	  as	  a	  Hindu	  State,	  and	  eventually	  culminating	  in	  the	  election	  of	  Narenda	  Modi,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right’s	  ideological	  wing	  the	  Rashtriya	  Swayam	  Seva	  (RSS	  –	  National	  Volunteer	  Organisation)	  as	  India’s	  prime	  minister	  in	  May	  2014.	  1	  I	  unpack	  how	  Bandung’s	  embrace	  of	  a	  postcolonial	  nationalist	  project	  that	  prioritized	  the	  form	  of	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐‑state	  unleashed	  a	  deeply	  conservative	  force	  in	  India,	  laying	  bear	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  the	  ostensibly	  progressive	  liberal	  commitments	  of	  Bandung.	  This	  dark	  side	  has	  been	  nurtured	  by	  the	  Indian	  judiciary	  in	  a	  number	  of	  landmark	  decisions	  that	  have	  enabled	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  parties.	  In	  particular,	  their	  vision	  of	  a	  Hindu	  nation-­‐‑state	  is	  advanced	  in	  and	  through	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  right	  to	  equality	  and	  secularism.	  	  	  
In	  this	  paper	  I	  discuss	  a	  central	  paradox	  of	  Bandung:	  how	  the	  embrace	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  equality	  for	  all	  by	  the	  countries	  present	  (Part	  C,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Self-­‐‑Determination,	  Final	  Communiqué,	  1955)	  is	  set	  in	  tension	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  their	  distinct	  anti-­‐‑colonial,	  non-­‐‑western,	  cultural	  and	  civilizational	  formation	  (Part	  B,	  Cultural	  Co-­‐‑Operation,	  Final	  Communiqué	  1955).	  This	  tension	  between	  equality	  and	  difference	  not	  only	  plays	  out	  externally,	  where	  the	  postcolonial	  nation-­‐‑state	  asserts	  its	  distinct	  political	  and	  cultural	  position	  from	  the	  “West”,	  but	  also	  internally	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  postcolonial	  India,	  where	  it	  produced	  the	  very	  politics	  of	  exclusion	  and	  subordination	  of	  the	  “other”,	  specifically	  religious	  minorities,	  which	  was	  a	  core	  feature	  of	  colonial	  governance.	  This	  feature	  thus	  implicates	  Bandung	  in	  the	  colonial	  debris	  that	  lies	  scattered	  in	  the	  sensibilities	  of	  the	  postcolonial	  present.	  The	  toxic	  and	  violent	  accruals	  of	  the	  colonial	  past	  are	  not	  time	  bound	  and	  take	  on	  durable	  forms	  in	  the	  present	  through	  the	  very	  tools	  of	  modernity	  that	  mark	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  postcolonial	  nation	  state,	  including	  human	  rights.	  In	  postcolonial	  India,	  this	  durability	  is	  enabled	  partly	  through	  the	  displacement	  of	  the	  Nehurvian	  vision	  of	  a	  nation-­‐‑state	  based	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  secularism	  committed	  to	  a	  wall	  of	  separation	  between	  religion	  and	  state,	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  Gandhian	  vision	  based	  on	  the	  equal	  treatment	  of	  all	  religions.2	  	  	  This	  tangible	  shift	  provides	  an	  inroad	  for	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  to	  develop	  the	  principles	  of	  equality,	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  tolerance,	  which	  are	  the	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  Indian	  secularism,	  in	  a	  direction	  that	  supports	  their	  vision	  of	  establishing	  a	  Hindu	  state	  and	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  their	  ultimate	  emergence	  as	  a	  powerful	  and	  significant	  force	  in	  contemporary	  Indian	  politics.	  	  The	  values	  of	  Bandung,	  celebrated	  as	  a	  point	  of	  arrival	  for	  newly	  independent	  nation	  states	  and	  freedom	  from	  colonial	  rule,	  obscured	  the	  imperial	  effects	  or	  dark	  side	  that	  shadowed	  these	  values.	  These	  effects	  weave	  their	  way	  through	  the	  body	  and	  soul	  of	  a	  nation-­‐‑state,	  and	  leave	  their	  mark	  in	  tangible,	  though	  also	  elusive	  ways.	  While	  India	  embraced	  the	  project	  of	  human	  rights	  as	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  the	  modern	  liberal	  democratic	  state,	  the	  understanding	  of	  these	  rights	  is	  shaped	  against	  the	  historical	  backdrop	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter,	  which	  nurtured	  a	  cultural	  nationalism	  that	  enabled	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  nation-­‐‑state	  as	  distinctly	  Hindu.	  In	  this	  understanding	  the	  fundamental	  human	  rights	  of	  religious	  minorities	  became	  contingent	  on	  either	  assimilating	  to	  Hindu	  majoritarianism	  by	  surrendering	  their	  distinct	  cultural	  and	  religious	  identity	  or	  risking	  exclusion,	  incarceration,	  and	  even	  annihilation	  for	  failing	  to	  comply.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  how	  the	  paradox	  presented	  at	  Bandung,	  between	  an	  anti-­‐‑colonial	  nationalism	  and	  equality,	  was	  not	  a	  recipe	  for	  a	  radical	  politics.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  discuss	  the	  work	  of	  two	  of	  the	  early	  ideologues	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right,	  V.	  D.	  Savarkar	  and	  M.S.	  Golwalkar	  to	  illustrate	  how	  this	  paradox	  partly	  facilitates	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right,	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  justify	  Hindu	  majoritarianism	  in	  and	  through	  the	  discourse	  of	  equality	  secularism.	  In	  the	  second	  part,	  I	  examine	  how	  the	  judiciary	  increasingly	  validates	  the	  Hindu	  Rights	  version	  of	  equality	  and	  secularism	  and	  in	  the	  process	  Hindu	  majoritarianism.	  The	  end	  result	  is	  not	  a	  betrayal	  of	  the	  Bandung	  dream,	  but	  rather	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  dark	  side	  that	  constituted	  part	  of	  that	  dream.	  
Cultural	  Distinction	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  the	  “Hindu	  Nation”	  	   The	  Bandung	  conference	  was	  in	  part	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  reassertion	  of	  the	  distinct	  traditional	  cultures	  and	  religions	  of	  those	  present	  that	  colonial	  rule	  had	  tried	  to	  reform,	  marginalize	  or	  eradicate.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  modern	  world,	  the	  conference	  called	  for	  a	  renewal	  of	  ancient	  Asian	  and	  African	  cultures	  and	  religions,	  which	  were	  seen	  as	  thwarted	  in	  their	  development	  for	  centuries	  as	  a	  result	  of	  colonial	  rule	  (Wright	  1956,	  p.	  204).	  At	  the	  cultural	  level,	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  “Asian”	  voice	  was	  a	  unifying	  force	  that	  was	  set	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  “West”	  in	  terms	  of	  race,	  religion	  and	  culture.	  This	  effort	  to	  identify	  and	  embrace	  that,	  which	  was	  distinct	  from	  the	  west,	  would	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  calling	  for	  a	  return	  to	  a	  pre-­‐‑colonial,	  pre-­‐‑colonised	  era,	  and	  excavation	  of	  that	  which	  was	  truly	  authentic.	  	  Jawaharlal	  Nehru	  himself	  embodied	  this	  vision	  of	  a	  nation	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  west,	  and	  in	  Bandung	  was	  regarded	  as	  projecting	  a	  culturally	  superior	  attitude	  induced	  by	  a	  “conscious	  identification	  with	  an	  ancient	  civilization.”	  (Romulo	  1956,	  pp.11-­‐‑12).	  This	  vision	  became	  prescient	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  fundamentalist	  and	  deeply	  conservative	  forces	  would	  repeat	  the	  colonial	  effects	  of	  governance	  in	  response	  to	  their	  religious	  minorities.	  Within	  postcolonial	  India,	  culture,	  religion	  and	  race,	  were	  all	  deployed	  not	  only	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  Christian	  west,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  religious	  “other”,	  most	  specifically	  the	  Muslim.	  Both	  of	  these	  moves	  were	  essential	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  distinct	  national	  identity.	  	  While	  Nehru	  and	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress	  party	  struggled	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  balance	  the	  diverse	  segments	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  nationalist	  project,	  the	  Hindu	  Mahasabha,	  a	  nationalist	  organization	  founded	  in	  1914	  and	  that	  campaigned	  for	  Hindu	  political	  unity,	  took	  advantage	  of	  this	  political	  indeterminacy	  by	  firmly	  and	  forcefully	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  life	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state	  could	  only	  be	  construed	  and	  representative	  of	  a	  portion	  of	  its	  citizenry	  –	  that	  is	  the	  Hindus.3	  The	  most	  influential	  early	  exponent	  of	  this	  position	  was	  V.D.	  Sarvarkar,	  president	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Mahasabha	  (Sarvarkar	  1923).	  Savarkar	  argued	  that	  the	  inimitable	  Indian	  state	  formation	  was	  to	  be	  crystallized	  through	  the	  energies	  of	  Hindus	  to	  pursue	  a	  distinct	  sovereign	  form	  that	  was	  founded	  and	  articulated	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  emerging	  idea	  of	  Pakistan	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Indian	  Republic	  as	  envisioned	  by	  Nehru.	  While	  Sarvarkar	  and	  Nehru	  were	  both	  opposed	  to	  every	  manifestation	  of	  Empire,	  their	  positions	  diverged	  on	  how	  the	  newly	  emerging	  nation	  state	  was	  going	  to	  assert	  its	  autonomy	  and	  identity	  (Sarkar	  2002;	  Sarkar	  et	  al,	  1993).	  	  Nehru	  and	  the	  Congress	  party	  were	  intent	  on	  establishing	  a	  British	  model	  of	  governance	  where	  sovereignty	  was	  equated	  with	  a	  coming	  together	  of	  “consensual	  political	  will,	  paternalistic	  protection,	  and	  a	  universal	  democratic	  citizenry’s	  inalienable	  right	  to	  life	  “(Basu	  2008,	  p.	  146).	  In	  contrast,	  V.D.	  Sarvarkar’s	  ideology	  was	  based	  on	  the	  commonality	  of	  one	  section	  of	  the	  citizenry:	  	  	  [T]he	  life	  of	  a	  nation	  is	  the	  life	  of	  that	  portion	  of	  its	  citizens	  whose	  interests	  and	  history	  and	  aspirations	  are	  most	  closely	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  land	  and	  who	  thus	  provide	  the	  real	  foundation	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  national	  state…So	  with	  the	  Hindus,	  they	  being	  the	  people	  whose	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  are	  most	  closely	  bound	  with	  the	  soil	  of	  Hindusthan	  as	  Pitribhu	  [Fatherland],	  as	  
Punyabhu	  [Holyland],	  they	  constitute	  the	  foundation,	  the	  bedrock,	  the	  
reserved	  forces	  of	  the	  Indian	  State	  (Sarvarkar	  1989,	  p.	  139).	  	  	   The	  pamphlet	  was	  published	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Hindu	  Mahasabha	  was	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  developing	  a	  response	  to	  the	  government’s	  1909	  Minto-­‐‑Moreley	  reforms.4	  These	  reforms	  gave	  separate	  electorates	  to	  candidates	  who	  mobilized	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  Muslim	  League.5	  	  	  The	  Act	  became	  a	  precursor	  to	  the	  two-­‐‑nation	  theory	  that	  garnered	  strength	  as	  Muslims	  in	  India	  became	  increasingly	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  a	  minority	  in	  a	  free	  and	  independent	  India.	  The	  Congress	  attempted	  to	  maneuver	  this	  tension	  through	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  League	  and	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  an	  Undivided	  India	  (Akhand	  Bharat).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Hindu	  Mahasabha’s	  intervention	  opposed	  the	  secular	  balance	  advocated	  by	  the	  Congress,	  and	  identified	  Hindus	  as	  a	  distinct	  race,	  with	  an	  originary	  way	  of	  life	  and	  cultural	  values.	  This	  ideological	  stand	  articulated,	  as	  
Hindutva	  was	  to	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  distinct	  national	  identity	  and	  homeland	  espoused	  by	  the	  Hindu	  Mahasabha.	  	  Sarvarkar	  emphasised	  that	  Hindutva	  and	  Hinduness	  were	  political	  concepts,	  and	  also	  that	  that	  Hindutva	  was	  different	  from	  Hinduism.	  	   [W]hen	  we	  attempt	  to	  investigate	  into	  the	  essential	  significance	  of	  Hindutva	  we	  do	  not	  primarily-­‐‑	  and	  certainly	  not	  mainly	  –	  concern	  ourselves	  with	  any	  particular	   theocratic	   or	   religious	   dogma	   or	   creed.	   Had	   not	   linguistic	   usage	  stood	  in	  our	  way	  then	  `Hinduness’	  would	  have	  certainly	  been	  a	  better	  word	  than	   Hinduism	   as	   a	   near	   parallel	   to	   Hindutva.	   Hindutva	   embraces	   all	   the	  departments	   of	   thought	   and	   activity	   of	   the	   whole	   being	   of	   our	   Hindu	   role	  (Sarvarkar	  1989,	  pp.	  3-­‐‑4).	  	  	  Sarvarkar	   used	   the	   argument	   of	   Hindutva	   and	   Hinduness	   as	   distinct	   from	  Hinduism	   as	   a	   means	   for	   achieving	   superiority	   of	   the	   Hindu	   race,	   rather	   than	  religion.	   According	   to	   Savarkar,	   “Hindus	   are	   not	  merely	   the	   citizens	   of	   the	   Indian	  state	  because	  they	  are	  united	  not	  only	  by	  the	  bonds	  of	  love	  they	  bear	  to	  a	  common	  motherland	  but	  also	  by	  the	  bonds	  of	  a	  common	  blood…”	  (Sarvarkar	  1989,	  pp.	  115-­‐‑116).	  In	  this	  definition,	  a	  Hindu	  was	  thus	  classified	  in	  racial	  terms.	  But	  Sarvarkar	  did	  not	  stop	  at	  this	  concept	  of	  a	  common	  fatherland	  and	  a	  common	  racial	  bond.	  Rather,	  for	  him,	  a	  Hindu	  was	  also	  one	  who	  inherits	  Indian	  civilization	  and	  share	  a	  common	  cultural	   heritage	   as	   well	   as	   religion,	   namely	   Hinduism.	   In	   Savarkar’s	   definition	   a	  Hindu	  is	  a	  “person	  who	  regards	  the	  land	  of	  Bharatvarsha	  from	  Indus	  to	  the	  East	  as	  his	  Fatherland	  as	  well	  as	  his	  Holyland	  –	  that	  is	  the	  cradle	  of	  his	  religion”	  (Sarvarkar	  1989,	   p.	   116).	   It	   is	   though	   this	   elision	   of	   the	   fatherland	   and	   the	   holyland	   that	  Savarkar	   constructs	   the	   political	   category	   of	   Hindu	   in	   opposition	   to	   non-­‐‑Hindus,	  particularly	   to	  Muslims	   and	   Christians,	   who,	   while	   sharing	   a	   common	   fatherland,	  their	   holyland	  was	   other	   than	   India.	   The	   construction	   of	   a	   `Hindu	   race’	   was	   thus	  achieved	  by	  continuously	  posting	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  `Hindu’	  and	  `others’,	  most	  notably,	  the	  `Muslim	  invader.	  Thus,	  while	  Savarkar	  was	  emphatic	  that	  Hindutva	  was	  
distinct	   from	   Hinduism,	   it	   was	   also	   clear	   in	   his	   writings	   that	   Hinduism	   was	   an	  important	  part	  of	  being	  Hindu.	  Despite	  the	  emphasis	  on	  racial	  differences,	  it	  was	  the	  difference	   of	   religion	   that	   remained	   as	   a	   constituting	  moment	   of	   the	   oppositional	  identities.	  This	  position	  is	  similar	  to	  how	  the	  final	  communiqué	  of	  Bandung	  blends	  religion	   and	   civilization.	   Both	   Hindutva	   and	   Bandung	   had	   a	   cultural	   “other”:	  Muslims	  and	  the	  West	  respectively.	  	  The	  definition	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Rashtra	  (Hindu	  Nation)	  was	  further	  articulated	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  M.S.	  Golwalkar.6	  	  Golwalkar's	  vision	  of	  a	  Hindu	  nation	  included	  five	  components:	  geography	  or	  country;	  race,	  religion,	  culture	  and	  language	  (Golwalkar	  1939,	   p.	   18).	   	   Golwalkar	   argued	   that	   the	   Hindus	   qualified	   under	   each	   of	   these	  categories,	   and	   thus,	   constituted	   a	   nation.	   “Hindustan,	   the	   land	   of	   the	   Hindus...	   a	  definite	   geographical	   entity”	   constitutes	   a	   country.	   “[T]he	   Hindu	   Race	   is	   united	  together	   by	   common	   traditions,	   .	   .	   .	   memories,	   .	   .	   .	   culture,	   ..	   .language,...	   [and]	  customs,”	   and	   thus	   constitutes	   a	   race	   (Golwalkar	   1939,	   p.	   40).	   On	   religion	   and	  culture	  he	  stated	  that	  Hinduism	  is	  the	  “only	  religion	  in	  the	  world	  worthy	  of	  being	  so	  denominated,	  which	  in	  its	  variety	  is	  still	  an	  organic	  whole”	  (Golwalkar	  1939,	  p.	  41).	  Through	   this	   religion	   “the	  Race	   evolved	   a	   culture	  which	   despite	   the	   degenerating	  contact	  with	   the	  debased	   'civilisations'	   of	   the	  Mussalmans	   and	   the	  Europeans,	   for	  the	   last	   ten	   centuries,	   is	   still	   the	   noblest	   in	   the	   world”	   (Golwalkar	   1939,p.	   43).	  Golwalkar	   concluded,	   “this	   country,	   Hindustan,	   the	   Hindu	   Race	   with	   its	   Hindu	  Religion,	   Hindu,	   Culture,	   and	   Hindu	   Language,	   complete	   the	   Nation	   concept”	  (Golwalkar	  1939,p.	  45-­‐‑46)	  	  	  While	   Hindutva	   is	   at	   one	   level	   a	   project	   of	   cultural,	   racial,	   and	   linguistic	  homogenisation,	  it	  is	  also	  articulated	  as	  a	  geographical	  project.	  “Hindustan,	  the	  land	  of	  the	  Hindus,	  is	  a	  definite	  geographical	  unity”	  that	  constitutes	  a	  country	  (Golwalkar	  1939,	  p.	  40).	  While	  Bandung	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  state	  building	  project	  to	  seize	  power	   from	   the	  West,	  Hindutva	   is	   a	   state	   building	   project	   designed	   to	   exclude	   or	  erase	  the	  Muslim	  “other.”	  Despite	  Golwalkar's	  insistence	  on	  the	  distinct	  nature	  of	  the	  five	  categories,	  it	  is	   in	   fact	   the	  common	  religion	  of	  Hinduism	  from	  which	  the	  entire	  definition	  of	   the	  Hindu	  Nation	  is	  derived.	  Race	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  common	  culture.	  And	  culture	  is	  in	  turn	  defined	  almost	  wholly	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  common	  religion,	  since	  in	  Golwalkar's	  view	  religion	  and	  culture	   for	   the	  Hindus	  are	  virtually	   indistinguishable.	  Country	   is	  simply	   the	  geographical	   territory	  where	  a	  people	  united	  by	   religion/	   culture/race	  live,	   and	   language,	   similarly,	   that	  which	  a	  people	  united	  by	   religion/	   culture/race,	  speak.	   The	   priority	   of	   religion	  within	   this	   construct	   reveals	   that	   the	   appeal	   for	   a	  Hindu	  Nation	  is	  thus	  very	  much	  an	  appeal	  to	  religion.	  In	  Golwalkar's	  discussion	  those	  who	  were	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Race	  still	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	   the	  Hindu	  Nation	   if	   they	  abandoned	  their	  differences,	  adopted	   the	   religion,	   culture	   and	   language	   of	   the	   Hindu	   Nation	   and	   completely	  merged	   themselves	   in	   the	   national	   race	   (Golwalkar	   1966,	   p.	   130).	   The	   call	   for	  assimilation	   was	   thus,	   first	   and	   foremost,	   a	   call	   for	   religious	   assimilation;	   for	  minorities	   to	   return	   to	   the	   folds	   of	   Hinduism.	   It	   was	   only	   secondarily	   a	   call	   to	  
assimilate	  into	  the	  culture	  and	  race,	   in	  so	  far	  as	  this	  culture	  and	  race	  is	  one	  that	  is	  derivative	   of	   the	   religious	   category.	   Golwalkar	   makes	   clear	   that	   those	   religious	  minorities	  who	  failed	  to	  assimilate	  must	  “lose	  their	  separate	  existence	  to	  merge	  in	  the	   Hindu	   race,	   or	   may	   stay	   in	   the	   country,	   wholly	   subordinated	   to	   the	   Hindu	  Nation,	   claiming	   nothing,	   deserving	   no	   privileges,	   far	   less	   any	   preferential	  
treatment-­‐‑not	  even	  citizen's	   rights”	   (Golwalkar	   1939,	   pp.47-­‐‑48)	   [emphasis	   added].	  The	   Hindu	   Nation	   was	   thus	   constituted	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   Golwalkar	   through	   an	  expression	  of	  enmity	  to	  religious	  minorities.	  These	  conceptualizations	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Nation	  continue	  to	  inform	  the	  political	  agenda	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  today.	  The	  contemporary	  ideologues	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  continue	  to	  emphasize	  a	  distinction	  between	  Hindu	  and	  Hinduism,	  and	  to	  insist	  that	  Hindu	  is	  an	  attitude	  of	  allegiance.	  The	  supremacy	  of	  Hinduism	  remains	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  political	   claims	   against	   the	  minorities,	  who	   follow	   religions	   that	   allow	  neither	  toleration	  nor	  secularism.	  It	  is	  within	  this	  context	  that	  the	  campaign	  to	  construct	  a	  Ram	  temple	  in	  Ayodhya	  acquired	  such	  importance	  and	  that	  the	  religious	  nature	  of	  the	  political	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  has	  become	  most	  evident.	  	  
	  
`Belief’	  in	  Secularism	  	  In	   the	   Ayodhya	   campaign	   the	  Hindu	  Right	   sought	   to	   have	   the	   16th	   century	  Babri	   Masjid	   replaced	   with	   a	   Hindu	   temple.	   It	   has	   proved	   to	   be	   enormously	  successful	  in	  generating	  broad-­‐‑based	  support	  for	  the	  Hindu	  Right.	  The	  Hindu	  Right	  alleged	  that	  the	  mosque	  was	  built	  on	  the	  site	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  Hindu	  god	  Ram	  and	  demanded	   that	   it	   be	   removed,	   and	   a	   temple	   commemorating	   the	   birth	   of	   Ram	  be	  built	   in	   its	   place.	   The	   campaign	   succeeded	   in	  mobilizing	   thousands	   of	   supporters,	  some	  of	  whom	  followed	   the	  marchers	   to	  Ayodhya,	  while	  many	  others	  sent	  money	  and	  bricks	   to	  help	   construct	   the	  new	   temple.	  On	  6th	  December	  1992,	  mobs	  of	   the	  Hindu	  Right	  destroyed	  the	  Babri	  Masjid,	  triggering	  massive	  communal	  riots	  around	  the	  country,	  in	  which	  thousands	  of	  people	  were	  killed.	  Despite	  the	  national	  outcry	  condemning	  the	  Hindu	  Right,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  BJP	   in	   the	   destruction	   and	   the	   violence	   that	   followed	   in	   its	   wake,	   the	   political	  momentum	   of	   the	   BJP	   continued	   to	   grow.	   In	   the	   1996	   national	   elections,	   the	   BJP	  emerged	  as	  the	  largest	  single	  political	  party	  and	  was	  asked	  to	  form	  the	  government.	  Unable	   to	   secure	   the	   support	   required	   to	   form	   a	   coalition	   government,	   the	   BJP	  government	   fell	   within	   two	   weeks.	   But	   the	   enormous	   increase	   in	   its	   popularity	  among	  the	  Indian	  electorate	  could	  not	  be	   ignored.	   In	  the	  1998	  elections,	   following	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  United	  Front	  government	  (an	  unstable	  alliance	  of	  India's	  regional	  parties	  and	   the	  Left,	  with	  Congress	  supporting	   the	  coalition	   from	  the	  outside),	   the	  BJP	   again	   emerged	  as	   the	   largest	   single	  party,	   and	   successfully	   formed	  a	   coalition	  government	   that	  governed	   from	  1999	  to	  2004.	   It	  was	  again	  voted	  out	  of	  power	   in	  the	   2004	   elections,	   after	   presiding	   over	   the	   worst	   communal	   riots	   since	  Independence,	   in	   Gujarat	   in	   2002	   where	   Narender	   Modi	   was	   the	   state’s	   chief	  minister.	  However,	   in	  May	  2014,	   the	  BJP	  was	  elected	  with	  a	  majority	   government	  after	   ten	  years	  of	   rule	  by	   the	  National	  Democractic	  Alliance,	   a	   coalition	   led	  by	   the	  
Congress	   party.	   Narender	   Modi,	   a	   former	   pracharak	   (lobbyist)	   of	   Hindutva	   and	  member	  of	  the	  RSS,	  was	  anointed	  the	  new	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  The	   2014	   elections	   signal	   a	   major	   shift	   in	   the	   political	   and	   cultural	  constellation	  of	  India	  in	  the	  direction	  that	  was	  envisioned	  by	  the	  early	  ideologues	  of	  the	   Hindu	   Right.	   The	   successful	   political	   inroads	   of	   the	   BJP	   must	   be	   seen	   in	   the	  broader	   context	  of	   the	  discursive	   struggles	  of	   the	  Hindu	  Right	   in	  which	   they	  have	  attempted	  to	  establish	  their	  vision	  of	  Hindutva	  as	  ideologically	  dominant,	  partly	  by	  using	  the	  very	  principles	  of	  equality	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  distinction	  embraced	  by	  the	  Bandung	  conference.	  Through	  their	  collective	  efforts,	  they	  have	  sought	  to	  naturalize	  the	   ideas	   of	   Hindutva	   by	   making	   these	   ideas	   a	   part	   of	   the	   common	   sense	   of	   an	  increasingly	   large	  segment	  of	  Hindu	  society	  as	  well	  as	  by	  making	   inroads	   into	   the	  constitutional	  definition	  of	  secularism,	  which	  has	  received	  judicial	  sanction.	  	   	   In	   the	   contemporary	   political	   terrain	   Hindutva	   thus	   continues	   to	   be	   a	  political	  category	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  religion	  of	  Hinduism,	  but	  which	  relies	  on	  religion	   in	   constituting	   the	   political	   category	   of	   Hindu.	   It	   is	   opposite	   to	   the	  Nehruvian	  vision	  of	  state	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  fragments	  and	  one	  committed	  to	  a	  secular	  ideal	   based	   on	   a	  model	   separation	   of	   state	   and	   religion	   and	   state	   neutrality	   in	   all	  matters	  of	   religion.	  This	  model	  based	  on	   the	   idea	   that	   religion	   could	  be	   exorcised	  from	  the	  body	  politic	  of	  a	  nation	  seemed	  to	  contradict	  the	  underlying	  and	  unifying	  idea	   of	   the	   Bandung	   conference,	   where	   those	   present	   sought	   to	   distinguish	  themselves	   from	  the	  West,	  partly	   through	   the	  reassertion	  of	   their	  distinct	   cultural	  and	  religious	  values	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  final	  communiqué.	  Both	  Hindutva	  and	  Bandung	  draw	   on	   the	   logic	   of	   tolerance	   as	   opposed	   to	   neutrality,	   and	   it	   is	   this	   move	   that	  influences	   the	  Hindu	  Rights	   embrace	   of	   a	   distinct	  model	   of	   secularism	  within	   the	  Indian	  context.	  	   	   At	  the	  point	  of	  Independence,	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  endorsed	  the	  Gandhian	  model	  of	   secularism	   based	   on	   the	   equal	   treatment	   of	   all	   religions.	   Like	   the	   liberal	  democratic	  vision	  of	  secularism,	  the	  Indian	  model	  is	  based	  on	  equality	  and	  freedom	  of	   religion.	  However,	   toleration	  displaces	   the	   third	  principle	  of	   the	   liberal	  vision	  –	  that	   is	   neutrality-­‐‑	   in	   the	   Indian	   model.	  7	  The	   Hindu	   Right	   has	   used	   this	   model	   of	  secularism	   to	   challenge	   the	   appeasement	   of	   the	   religious	   minorities	   while	  simultaneously	   entrenching	   Hindu	   majoritarianism.	   They	   have	   sought	   to	   cast	  themselves	   as	   the	   true	   inheritors	   of	   India's	   secular	   tradition	   or	   the	   promoters	   of	  "genuine"	   secularism.	   Their	   success	   in	   infusing	   the	   constitutional	   principles	   of	  secularism	  and	  equality	  with	  new	  meaning,	   consistent	  with	   its	  vision	  of	  Hindutva,	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  Hindutva	  cases	  (1996)	  of	  the	  Indian	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Allahabad	  High	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  2010	  in	  suits	  filed	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  disputed	  area	  of	  land	  in	  Ayodhya,	  where	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  parties	  have	  sought	  to	  construct	  a	  Ram	  temple.	   These	   judgments	   need	   to	   situated	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	  discursive	   struggles	   of	   the	   Hindu	   Right	   and	   its	   efforts	   to	   legitimize	   its	   vision	   of	  Hindu	  supremacy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  free	  and	  independent	  India	  as	  a	  Hindu	  nation-­‐‑state.	  	  
The	  Indian	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  defining	  the	  content	  of	  religion,	  where	  ideas	  of	  nationalism	  as	  well	  as	  Hindu	  majoritarianism	  increasingly	  converge,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  establishing	  the	  contours	  of	  secularism.	  The	  most	  famous	  decisions	  delivered	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  1996	  were	  in	  the	  Hindutva	  cases.8	  In	  these	  cases,	  several	  speeches	  of	  Shiv	  Sena/BJP	  candidates	  during	  a	  state	  election	  campaign	  in	  1987	  were	  challenged	  as	  appealing	  to	  religion	  to	  gain	  votes	  and	  in	  the	  process	  promote	  religious	  enmity	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Representation	  of	  the	  People	  Act,	  1951.	  Although	  the	  Court	  found	  several	  of	  the	  accused	  guilty,	  it	  also	  held	  that	  Hindutva	  -­‐‑	  the	  ideological	  linchpin	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right	  -­‐‑	  simply	  represented	  "a	  way	  of	  life	  of	  people	  of	  the	  subcontinent."10	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  Hindutva	  could	  not	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  or	  understood	  as	  religious	  fundamentalism	  or	  as	  a	  depiction	  of	  an	  attitude	  hostile	  to	  persons	  practicing	  other	  religions.	  Rather,	  Hindutva	  was	  used	  to	  promote	  secularism	  -­‐‑	  emphasising	  the	  way	  of	  life	  of	  the	  Indian	  people	  and	  the	  Indian	  culture,	  or	  to	  criticize	  the	  policy	  of	  any	  political	  party	  as	  discriminating	  or	  intolerant.11	  It	  held	  that	  appealing	  to	  Hindutva	  was	  neither	  an	  appeal	  to	  religion	  nor	  a	  promotion	  of	  religious	  hatred,	  and	  thus	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Act.	  The	  decision	  illustrates	  how	  secularism	  comes	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  majoritarianism	  through	  Hindutva.	  The	  Court's	  conclusion	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  
Hindutva	  is	  legally,	  historically,	  and	  politically	  unsupportable.	  The	  writings	  of	  the	  ideological	  leaders	  discussed	  earlier,	  reveal	  how	  Hindutva	  was	  the	  mental	  state	  or	  attitude	  of	  the	  Hindu	  race	  and	  the	  Hindu	  nation	  -­‐‑	  a	  race	  and	  a	  nation	  that	  were,	  at	  their	  very	  core,	  about	  religion.	  And	  the	  minorities	  were	  constructed	  as	  the	  enemies	  or	  threat	  to	  this	  Hindu	  nation.	  	  Fourteen	  years	  later,	  on	  September	  30th,	  2010,	  the	  Allahabad	  High	  Court	  decided	  largely	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Hindu	  parties	  in	  the	  suits	  filed	  to	  determine	  the	  title	  to	  the	  plot	  of	  land	  on	  which	  they	  have	  sought	  to	  build	  a	  Ram	  temple	  –	  precisely	  on	  the	  spot	  where	  the	  Babri	  mosque	  once	  stood.	  While	  the	  case	  is	  a	  complicated	  one	  (Kapur	  2014),	  all	  the	  judges	  seemed	  to	  agree	  that	  worship	  at	  the	  site	  constituted	  a	  core	  ingredient	  for	  the	  Hindu	  faith,	  and	  in	  the	  words	  of	  one	  judge,	  to	  disallow	  prayer	  would	  be	  “to	  extinguish	  the	  very	  religion.”	  9	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  The	  principles	  of	  equality	  and	  recognition	  of	  cultural	  and	  civilizational	  differences	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Bandung	  Final	  Communique	  are	  inherently	  in	  tension.	  Bandung	  employed	  a	  universalism	  that	  was	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  imagined	  “	  renewal”	  of	  a	  pre-­‐‑imperial	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  alliance	  amongst	  African	  and	  Asian	  nations,	  despite	  their	  differences.	  Yet	  the	  Bandung	  principles	  (and	  international	  law)	  recognising	  the	  equality	  of	  all	  races,	  sat	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  abstention	  from	  intervention	  or	  interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  another.	  And	  this	  paradox	  of	  Bandung	  foregrounds	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  Hindu	  state	  through	  its	  adoption	  of	  the	  universal	  principles	  of	  human	  rights,	  including	  the	  right	  to	  equality,	  while	  also	  recognizing	  the	  cultural	  and	  civilization	  distinction	  of	  those	  countries	  present	  from	  the	  west	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  Muslim	  “other”.	  	  
The	  Hindu	  Right	  has	  secured	  an	  ideological	  grip	  within	  legal	  discourse	  where	  their	  successful	  engagements	  with	  the	  discourses	  of	  equality	  and	  secularism	  have	  been	  powerful	  and	  persuasive.	  And	  the	  judicial	  decisions	  are	  increasingly	  reflecting	  the	  influence	  of	  this	  discursive	  strategy,	  where	  secularism	  has	  come	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  Hindutva,	  the	  ideological	  core	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right,	  and	  sameness	  in	  treatment.	  This	  narrowing	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  equality	  and	  secularism	  has	  enabled	  the	  production	  of	  more	  violence	  against	  religious	  minorities,	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  self-­‐‑defence,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  setting	  up	  such	  minorities	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  secularism,	  equality,	  and	  the	  basic	  values	  of	  the	  constitution.	  The	  discussion	  highlights	  some	  of	  the	  less	  perceptible	  effect	  of	  the	  colonial	  encounter,	  which	  operated	  through	  the	  ecologies	  of	  governance	  in	  and	  through	  liberal	  rights.	  These	  effects	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  wholesale	  embrace	  of	  colonial	  technologies	  (Mbembe	  2001),	  but	  a	  reformulation	  and	  reordering	  of	  the	  art	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  management	  of	  religious	  minorities,	  while	  also	  constituting	  the	  very	  identity	  of	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐‑state.	  The	  durabilities	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  governance	  are	  mutated	  in	  the	  postcolonial	  present,	  are	  less	  visible	  and	  hence	  more	  insidious	  in	  remaining	  less	  identifiable.	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  1	  The'Hindu	  Right'	  refers	  to	  the	  main	  organizations	  and	  political	  parties	  in	  India	  including-­‐‑the	  Bharatiya	  Janata	  Party	  (BJP)	  (Indian	  Peoples	  Party),	  the	  Rashtriya	  Swayam	  Sevak	  Sangh	  (RSS)	  (National	  Volunteer	  Organisation),	  and	  the	  Vishwa	  Hindu	  Parishad	  (VHP)	  (World	  Hindu	  Council),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  militantly	  anti-­‐‑Muslim	  Shiv	  Sena	  (footsoldiers	  of	  Shiva).	  The	  central	  ideology	  of	  this	  political	  movement	  is	  Hindutva	  (literally	  translated	  as	  'Hinduness'),	  which	  seeks	  to	  establish	  the	  political,	  cultural	  and	  religious	  supremacy	  of	  Hinduism,	  and	  the	  Hindu	  nation.	  2	  The	  “equal	  treatment	  of	  all	  religions”	  is	  a	  model	  of	  secularism	  that	  does	  not	  require	  a	  wall	  of	  separation	  between	  religion	  and	  politics	  (Engineer	  1995)	  	  3	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Mahasabha	  was	  partly	  in	  response	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Muslim	  Legal,	  which	  was	  increasingly	  seeking	  a	  separate	  homeland.	  The	  Mahasbaha	  supported	  Hindu	  political	  unity,	  including	  education	  and	  economic	  development	  for	  Hindus	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reconversions	  of	  Muslims	  to	  Hinduism.	  It	  was	  also	  opposed	  to	  the	  vision	  of	  secularism	  that	  was	  envisaged	  by	  the	  Congress	  under	  Nehru.	  	  4	  Indian	  Councils	  Act1909.	  5	  The	  All	  India	  Muslim	  League	  was	  founded	  in	  1906	  by	  Aga	  Khan	  III.	  Its	  subsequent	  leaders	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  separate	  Muslim	  India,	  a	  demand	  that	  was	  formally	  made	  in	  1940	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Muhammad	  Ali	  Jinnah,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Pakistan	  6	  Madhav	  Sadhashiv	  Golwalkar	  was	  an	  active	  member	  of	  the	  RSS,	  the	  ideological	  wing	  of	  the	  Hindu	  Right.	  He	  became	  the	  second	  Supreme	  Chief	  (Sarsangchalak)	  of	  the	  RSS	  from	  1940-­‐‑1973	  and	  a	  major	  exponent	  of	  the	  ideological	  doctrine	  to	  establish	  India	  as	  a	  Hindu	  Rashtra	  (State).	  He	  called	  upon	  the	  religious	  minorities	  to	  give	  up	  their	  “foreign	  mental	  complexion	  and	  merge	  in	  the	  common	  stream	  of	  our	  national	  life”	  (Golwalkar	  1966,	  p.	  130;	  Sharma	  2007)	  	  7	  The	  separation	  thesis	  was	  rejected	  partly	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  a	  distinctly	  western	  concept.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  secularism	  project	  was	  also	  deeply	  implicated	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  nationalism,	  that	  provided	  a	  counter	  to	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  Muslims	  and	  other	  disadvantaged	  groups	  as	  well	  as	  to	  British	  colonial	  discourses:	  SHABNUM	  TEJANI,	  INDIAN	  SECULARISM:	  A	  SOCIAL	  AND	  INTELLECTUAL	  HISTORY,	  1890-­‐‑1950	  (2007).	  8	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  brevity	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  lead	  case	  Dr.	  Prabhoo	  v.	  Prabhakar	  Kasinath	  Kunte	  and	  Ors.	  1995	  S.C.A.L.E.	  1	  	  9	  Visharad	  v.	  Ahmad,	  O.O.S.,	  No.	  1	  of	  1989,	  All.	  H.C.,	  4	  (2010)	  (opinion	  of	  Sharma,	  J.,	  volume	  4)	  p.	  121	  
